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WHAT DARWINIAN MEDICINE
OFFERS PSYCHIATRY
RANDOLPH  NESSE
s
ince the late 1970s  psychiatry has accumulated an enormous
base of knowledge and remarkably effective new treatments. De-
spite this new knowledge, however, fundamental disagreements persist about
the very nature of psychopathology. While the need for a “bio-psycho-social
model” of mental disorders is widely acknowledged, psychiatry remains split
into factions, some that emphasize genetic/physiological factors and others
that focus on life events and psychological mechanisms. Some emphasize that
mental disorders are “diseases like all others” while others decry this “med-
ical model” and insist that many mental disorders can only be understood in
their social context.
An evolutionary approach to medicine poses equally thorny conceptual
issues. These difficulties include confusion about the distinction between
proximate and evolutionary explanations, the need to recognize vulnerabili-
ties instead of diseases as the object of evolutionary explanation, and the dif-
ficulties of finding adequate tests for many evolutionary hypotheses. In addi-
tion, a wrenching change in perspective is required to look for possible benefits
of traits or genes that also cause disease and to begin to ask why all members
of a species are susceptible to a disease, instead of why some individuals get
sick and others do not. Given difficulties faced by Darwinian medicine, its
application to psychiatry might seem to be a case of the blind leading the
befuddled. But in fact, psychopathology has been a major early target for sys-
tematic and somewhat successful evolutionary approaches to disease. Why?
The explanations are partly historical and partly a matter of the obvious need
to address some long-standing problems.
While medicine has long had a foundation in the functional understanding
provided by physiology, psychiatry has no comparable understanding of nor-
mal human behavior. The field of ethology has successfully traversed this
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path, and psychiatry is now where ethology was in the 1960s: trying to com-
pensate for the lack of a theoretical foundation by striving for scientific rigor
in detailed observations and measurements about carefully defined categories.
As soon as ethology found its bedrock in the principles of evolutionary biol-
ogy, it took off in a still-growing burst of scientific advances (Alcock, 1993;
Krebs and Davies, 1991). The hope that similar progress may be possible for
understanding human behavior explains the early interest of many psychia-
trists in an evolutionary approach. In addition to hopes fostered by history,
evolutionary approaches are also spurred by the need for a framework that
can accommodate the complexity of psychiatric disorders. The human ten-
dency to oversimplify causation has resulted in separate foci on genetic and
environmental causes of mental disorder, leaving chasms where there should
be studies of interaction effects. Distinguishing carefully between proximate
and evolutionary causation and between defenses and defects may help to
bridge this gap.
This chapter will not attempt to summarize all the work in evolutionary
psychology or even all of evolutionary psychiatry. Excellent overviews of
work in evolutionary approaches to human behavior are available (Barkow,
1989; Barkow et al., 1992; Betzig, 1997; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1983; Konner, 1983,
1990; Ridley, 1993; Smith and Winterhalder, 1992; Wright, 1994). Work spe-
cifically about psychopathology has been summarized in several review
articles (McGuire, 1977; McGuire et al. 1992; Nesse, 1984,  1991a), textbook
chapters (Gardner, 1995; Konner, 1995) and books on the topic (McGuire and
Fairbanks, 1977; McGuire and Troisi, 1998; Stevens and Price, 1996;  Wene-
grat, 1984, 1990).
Instead of reviewing all the available material, this chapter will use the
categories that proved appropriate for Darwinian medicine (Nesse and Wil-
liams, 1998; Williams and Nesse, 1991) to see how useful they can be in the
field of psychiatry. Evolutionary explanations for the vulnerabilities that make
us susceptible to disease fall into just a few categories. First, there are novel
environmental factors that change faster than our bodies can evolve. Many of
these novel factors are aspects of our human-constructed environment, but
novelty also emerges constantly from arms races between competing organ-
isms, either pathogens and hosts, predators and prey, or members of the same
species. Second, there are design trade-offs that offer an advantage overall, but
that leave us vulnerable to disease. Some such trade-offs are genes that cause
disease but give a net fitness advantage. Others are traits that remind us that
every aspect of the body is a compromise. Third, there are constraints, that is,
limits on what natural selection can do because of its stochastic nature and
the impossibility of “fresh starts” because every generation must compete and
survive. Finally, there are accidents and mishaps that cause disease that is
unrelated to the evolutionary process, except insofar as the body can or cannot
prevent or repair the damage (see table 14.1).
Of particular importance for psychiatry is another category, not a true cause
of susceptibility to disease, but one that is often confused with  diseases-
namely, defenses. Examples include the capacities for pain, fever, nausea,WHAT DARWINIAN MEDICINE OFFERS PSYCHIATRY 353
Table 14.1 Evolutionary explanations for disease
1. Novelty
a. From pathogens or competitors
b. From aspects of the modern environment
2. Trade-offs
a. Genes with costs as well as benefits
b. All traits have positive and negative trade-offs
3. Constraints
4. Accidents and mishaps too rare to shape defenses
(5. Defenses that are often confused with diseases.)
vomiting, cough, diarrhea, and fatigue. Aversive emotions like anxiety and
sadness almost certainly have similar origins and functions. We turn first to
these defenses.
Defenses, Normality, and Emotions
Much that seems abnormal about the functioning of the brain and the body is
not abnormal at all. Many manifestations of illness are not defects in the body’s
mechanisms, but sophisticated adaptations. They are observed only when
aroused by cues that indicate a situation where they may be helpful. For in-
stance, pain is aroused by cues that indicate tissue damage. It is not an ab-
normality itself, but a useful defense. People born without the capacity for
pain are usually dead by their early 30s (Melzack, 1973).
Some manifestations of disease, such as seizures, jaundice, coma, and pa-
ralysis, arise from defects in the organism. But many other manifestations of
disease are defenses. Coughing clears foreign matter from the respiratory tract.
Vomiting eliminates toxins from the stomach; diarrhea clears the colon. The
capacity for fatigue protects against tissue damage. The low iron levels seen
in chronic infection limit the growth of pathogens (Weinberg, 1984). Fever is
a particularly subtle and well-regulated defense against infection (Kluger,
1979), but it sometimes goes so high that seizures result. This is a fine example
of a cost that is maintained by the trade-off with its associated benefit. An
evolutionary approach encourages sharp attention to distinction between
manifestations of disease that are defects versus those that are defenses, and
it forces us to acknowledge that much suffering can be adaptive.
Most of the problems people bring to psychiatrists involve aversive emo-
tions. Patients complain of sadness, anxiety, jealousy, anger, or boredom. To
understand these complaints thoroughly, we need a comprehensive theory of
emotions, something that is just now being formulated. Emotions researchers
have reached a consensus that the fundamental emotional capacities have
been shaped by natural selection because they give a selective advantage (Ek-
man, 1992; Frank, 1988; Frijda, 1986; Nesse, 1990). Plutchik, in particular, has
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1980; Plutchik and Kellerman, 1989). Aversive emotions like anxiety and sad-
ness are almost certainly examples of defenses (Barlow, 1991; Morris, 1992;
Tooby  and Cosmides, 199Oa,b).  Recognizing the utility of aversive emotions
has implications for the whole problem of distinguishing normality versus
pathology in general, a long-standing conundrum for psychiatry. It is to this
large topic that we first turn.
It is easy to imagine how natural selection could have shaped the coherent
and consistent patterns of physiology, behavior, cognition, and subjective ex-
perience that we recognize as emotions. If our ancestors repeatedly encoun-
tered certain situations that posed consistent adaptive challenges, then indi-
viduals whose bodies adjusted so they could cope especially well with those
challenges would have a selective advantage (Nesse, 1990).
Take, for instance, male sexual jealousy. Daly and Wilson, among others,
have argued that this capacity is a mate-guarding tactic which, if absent, is
likely to result in a man having fewer children because his wife may some-
times be pregnant with the children of other men and because he will likely
invest much parental effort in children fathered by other men (Daly, Wilson,
and Weghorst, 1982; Symons, 1979). Although jealousy is an uncomfortable,
undesirable state that can give rise to antisocial acts, it nonetheless is likely
to increase reproductive success and therefore be maintained by natural se-
lection. Consistent with this hypothesis, sexual jealousy is more intense in
males than in females across a wide variety of cultures, despite the enormous
cultural differences in the situations that arouse jealousy and the intensity and
nature of its expression (Daly et al., 1982). Furthermore, there are sex differ-
ences in the cues that arouse jealousy. For men, cues to infidelity are more
potent, while for women, losses of relationships and resources are stronger
(Buss et al., 1992).
Such knowledge about the functions of normal jealousy is useful in under-
standing pathological jealousy. Although psychiatrists often interpret patho-
logical jealousy as reflecting repressed and projected sexual desires, an evo-
lutionary approach encourages the clinician to investigate whether the jealous
partner has reason to believe that the spouse may well prefer someone else.
Thus, during a period of loss of status or resources, or low self-esteem caused
by depression, a man is especially likely to begin acting more jealous. This
often precipitates a withdrawal of affection by the spouse, which is interpreted
as confirmation of suspicions of infidelity, and the escalating feedback spiral
can easily end a marriage or even lead to tragic violence.
Compared with jealousy, the utility of anxiety is more readily recognized,
but exactly how it increases fitness is not so easy to describe. More than 60
years ago, Cannon (1929) documented the many benefits of the “fight-flight
reaction” in the face of serious danger. He noted that everything about fear-
from the cooling sweat, to the trembling that indicates tense muscles, to the
increased clotting of blood and shortness of breath and rapid-pounding heart-
beat-were all useful when one needed to flee or fight. Today we recognize
this same pattern of responses as a panic attack. We now know  much more
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edge base about its functions and evolutionary origins remains quite crude.
Even a basic understanding can be useful, however. In the case of panic, it can
account for the syndrome of shortness of breath, a wish to  gee,  pounding heart,
sweating, and thinking of nothing but escape. Agoraphobia, fear of leaving the
home, is almost always a complication of panic attacks. What is the connec-
tion? There are various proximate explanations, but from an evolutionary
point of view, if you have just experienced life-threatening danger, it is wise
indeed to stay close to home or to go out only with a companion.
Marks and I have argued that the different subtypes of anxiety disorder and
their behavioral characteristics demonstrate a remarkable correspondence to
the different kinds of danger that humans are likely to have experienced during
the course of evolution (Marks and Nesse, 1994). Thus, fear of heights is man-
ifested by freezing. The sight of blood is the only fear that causes fainting, a
useful response if you are bleeding (Marks, 1988). A looming predator causes
flight. Social threats cause embarrassment and social anxiety. This approach
to the subtypes of anxiety obviates many of the difficulties posed by a system
of discrete anxiety disorders. Enormous effort has gone into trying to deter-
mine whether the anxiety disorders arise from one underlying disorder or if
they are variety of distinct diseases. An evolutionary approach suggests that
the various manifestations of anxiety have been partially differentiated by nat-
ural selection into incompletely differentiated subtypes, each designed to cope
with a particular kind of threat. If this is correct, it becomes less urgent to ask,
for instance, whether social phobia and generalized anxiety disorder are es-
sentially different or essentially the same. Both are overlapping response pat-
terns to somewhat related dangers.
An evolutionary view also assists in dismantling the false dichotomy of
instinct and learning. Research has begun to reveal the specialized learning
mechanisms that mediate fear (Marks, 1987; Marks and Tobena, 1990; Mineka
et al., 1980; Ohman and Dimberg,  1984). It has long been apparent that people
are more likely to be afraid of heights, spiders, or the dark than they are of
leaves, butterflies, or sunshine. For that matter, they are more likely to be afraid
of a garter snake, than some dangerous things like guns, knives, and greasy
hamburgers. In earlier work on preparedness, certain kinds of cues were found
to be more readily paired with certain kinds of responses (Garcia and Ervin,
1968; Seligman, 1970). For instance, it is easy to condition a nausea response
to a taste cue, and easy to condition a limb withdrawal response to a pain, but
difficult to switch the cues and responses around. Fundamental research on
learning is based increasingly on its evolutionary origins and functions, with
attempts at integration making good progress (Staddon, 1983).
Mood and Its Disorders
An evolutionary explanation for the capacity for high and low mood has been
a major, albeit unachieved, goal of evolutionary psychology. So far, even de-
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and depression remain fuzzy, and we do not even know if these intuitive
concepts reflect functionally distinct subsets of a single experience, separate
subcategories, or variations on the same response.
One major school of thought has emphasized the role of status changes in
the regulation and functions of mood. British psychiatrist John Price, after
recognizing a connection between pecking orders in birds and primate status
hierarchies, began work on the behaviors that follow a rise or fall in status
(Price,  1967;  Price and Sloman,  1987).  This work has been expanded and ex-
tended (Gardner,  1982;  Gilbert et al.,  1995;  Price and Sloman,  1987),  into a
theory that emphasizes the role of depression in creating “involuntary yield-
ing” and the benefits of voluntary yielding-that is, giving up a status com-
petition-in relieving depression (Gilbert, 1992).
The epidemiological studies of Brown and colleagues show the profound
effects of losses in precipitating depression, and the role of threats in precip-
itating anxiety disorders (Brown and Harris, 1978; Finlay-Jones and Brown,
1981).  In recent work from an evolutionary vantage point, Brown has reana-
lyzed these data and found that much of the variance in the loss events is
related to experiences of humiliation or entrapment (Brown et al., 1995).
Raleigh et al.  (1983,1991)  have studied related mechanisms in vervet mon-
keys. They found that whole-blood serotonin levels are high in the dominant
male, but fall precipitously with loss of rank. Monkeys that receive drugs that
increase serotonin levels (versus a placebo) reliably take over a group that has
no alpha male, while monkeys that receive drugs that block the effects of
serotonin are consistently displaced by those receiving a placebo. I know of
no other studies that so clearly demonstrate the two-way street between social
circumstances and brain chemistry.
Another tradition of work on depression goes back at least to the psycho-
analyst Bibring. He observed that depression often arises when a person is
pursuing an unattainable life goal, and often remits when that goal is achieved
or given up (Bibring, 1953). Gut (1989) has reinterpreted and extended this
work in an evolutionary context. She emphasizes the adaptive significance of
stopping current activity after a loss, conserving energy, and thinking hard
about the current situation and the available alternatives.
I have emphasized similar functions for mood as a regulator of patterns of
resource investment among a variety of enterprises with differing patterns of
risk and payoff (Nesse, 1990, 1991b). High mood tends to increase fitness in
situations of opportunity, whereas low mood tends to stop investment in hope-
less endeavors and facilitates consideration of alternative strategies or enter-
prises. In short, low mood is a coordinated pattern of responses that are useful
in unpropitious situations, whether the loss is discrete or continuing. Momen-
tary changes in positive and negative states may help to fine-tune the tactics
required for coping with everyday social life.
The relationship between sadness and depression remains problematic.
Sadness is almost certainly adaptive, but depression may arise from dysre-
gulated sadness or from an entirely separate mechanism. Also unanswered is
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and mood disorders (Kessler et al., 1994). Vulnerability to the severe mood
disorders is mediated substantially by genetic factors. Why the responsible
genes persist in the gene pool is another unanswered question. In the case of
manic-depressive disorder, it has been proposed that increased reproductive
success during periods of high mood may counterbalance the periods of low
reproductive success during low mood (Wilson, 1992).
Attachment and Relationships
Human emotions usually arise, of course, in the context of relationships. This
is not the place to review the complete history of work in this field, but Rene
Spitz’s studies of the high death rates in orphanages inspired Harlow (1974)
to carry out his well-known studies that showed infant monkeys prefer milk-
less terry-cloth “mothers” to wire-mesh “mothers” with a milk source. These
studies showed that both behaviorists and the psychoanalysts were wrong in
their supposition that attachment arises out of drive satisfaction. Influenced
by these studies, and by contact with ethologist Konrad Lorenz,  Bowlby (1969)
arrived at a view derived from psychoanalysis but informed by ethology.
Bowlby’s emphasis on the adaptive functions of attachment led to studies by
Ainsworth and others (1978) demonstrating strong correlations between pa-
rental behavior and children’s attachment styles and between a child’s attach-
ment pattern early in life and in later years. The strong implication through
most of these studies has been that the attachment style is shaped by the
mother’s behavior early in life. It is now clear, however, with recent studies
by Kagan et al. (1987) that these patterns are strongly influenced by genetic
factors. Furthermore, the suggestion has been made by that the “abnormal”
styles of attachment, specifically anxious attachment and ambivalent attach-
ment, may in fact be adaptive in certain situations (Chisholm, 1996). If the
mother is disinclined to invest in a child, ordinary secure attachment may be
less beneficial than anxious or avoidant attachment.
In work at the interface between attachment and depression,  Engel  and
Schmale  (1972) have argued that the protest phase of primate infant separation
alerts the mother, while the despair phase of quiet huddling conceals the in-
fant from predators and conserves energy in much the same way as hiberna-
tion. They suggest that the similarities among depression, hibernation, and the
despair phase of separation may arise from this mechanism.
Trivers’s theory of parent-offspring conflict (Trivers, 1974) has been re-
markably underutilized and even unrecognized in psychiatry. While many
clinicians continue to imagine that the interests of the mother and her infant
are identical, Trivers has shown that there are many situations in which a
mother can maximize her reproductive success by investing less in an off-
spring than is in the offspring’s interest. Because offspring share only half of
the mother’s genes, the fitness of the mother’s genes depends on correctly
allocating effort between having more offspring of her own or investing in the
offspring she already has. The specific conflicts depend on the stage of life andi I
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the available alternatives. Although Trivers noted the significance of conflicts
during adolescence, he used the weaning conflict as an exemplar. At some
stage of development it is to the infant’s advantage to continue to nurse, but
the mother’s genetic interests would be better served by starting to invest in
another offspring. Fierce battles arise that testify to the lack of concordance.
As Trivers  (1985:155)  notes wryly, “An offspring cannot fling its mother to the
ground and nurse at will. . . .  Given this competitive disadvantage, the off-
spring is expected to employ psychological tactics. It should attempt to  induce
more investment than the parent is selected to give.” In particular, Trivers
suggests, the child may pretend to be younger and more helpless than it really
is to try to deceive the mother into thinking it is still in her interest to provide
more help than she would otherwise. This is, of course, a fine description of
regression, and may explain not only the phenomenon of regression but also
the annoyance we experience when we think we are being manipulated by
people who act more helpless than they are.
Insight into the conflicts between offspring and parents has provided a
foundation for a reinterpretation of some core psychoanalytic ideas. Slavin
(1992) notes that it is in the interest of parents to suppress conflicts between
siblings, and it is also in the parents’ interests to manipulate their children to
cooperate more than is in the children’s best (fitness) interests (Slavin, 1992).
Slavin  (1992) proposes that if this excess cooperation persists into adulthood,
the result is neurosis, or worse. Several other authors, notably  Badcock  (1988)
and Rancour-Laferriere (1985), have gone much further and tried to under-
stand the possible adaptive significance of specific psychoanalytic phenomena
such as the Oedipus complex and castration anxiety. Daly and Wilson (1992)
however, note the ignorance of most psychoanalysts about fundamental evo-
lutionary principles. They have proposed alternative evolutionary explana-
tions for what have been described previously as Oedipal phenomena.
Trivers  (1976)  and Alexander (1974) have each proposed that a mechanism
for limiting self-knowledge might allow individuals to unconsciously, and
thus more successfully, pursue strategies of deception in reciprocity ex-
changes (Lockard and Paulhus, 1988). This explanation must, however, be
incomplete, given that we also repress the prods of conscience as well those
of the drives. Lloyd and I (Nesse and Lloyd, 1992)  have attempted to under-
stand the origins of the psychodynamic defenses, and more specifically to
understand ways in which a lack of knowledge about one’s own motives might
give a selective advantage. Much work remains to integrate psychodynamics
with a modern approach to evolution, but a start has been made (Badcock,
1988;  Stevens,  1982;  Wenegrat,  1990).
The principle of kin selection has proved particularly powerful in explain-
ing cooperation and lack of cooperation in the family (Essock-Vitale and Fair-
banks,  1979; Lancaster et al.,  1987).  Perhaps the single most dramatic finding
in the field so far has come been made by the behavioral ecologists Daly and
Wilson. On considering the phenomenon of fatal child abuse, they wondered
how this apparent anomaly could be reconciled with the evolutionary expec-
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hypothesized that perhaps the children who were killed were not, in fact, the
biological offspring of both parents in the home. When they did the study to
test this hypothesis, they found that the rates of child abuse in homes with at
least one step-parent were at least 70 times higher compared to homes with
both biological parents present (Daly and Wilson, 1981, 1989). This finding
could not be accounted for by confounding factors such as alcoholism, pov-
erty, or mental disorders. The discovery of this extraordinarily powerful effect
is highlighted, in contrast by decades of studies by child protection specialists
that had uncovered factors that are weak by comparison.
Marriage and Other Relationships
Understanding of the origins of conflicts over mates and mating strategies
(Hrdy, 1981) has given significant new insights into marriage and its vicissi-
tudes. Buss (1992) has documented, in a study of  37 human cultures, that in
choosing a mate, appearance is consistently more important to men, and
wealth is consistency more important to women. Given that variance in re-
productive success is quite limited in women, but can be large in men, the
two sexes can and do pursue different and often conflicting mating strategies
(Daly and Wilson, 1983). These distinct strategies help to account for patterns
of cooperation and conflict and are proving useful in understanding associated
marital pathology (Kerber, 1994).
Based on these principles, Fisher (1992) has summarized data from many
societies that shows an average duration of marriage of less than 5 years. She
argues that this is sufficient time to provide initial nurturing to human off-
spring, and that a mechanism (“planned obsolescence of the pair-bond”) may
have evolved to end marriages after this period of time. Although the data are
clear enough, it remains unclear why a specific mechanism would evolve to
end pair-bonds when spouses are certainly capable of discerning their indi-
vidual interests and pursuing them in a more flexible strategy of staying or
leaving (Betzig et al., 1988; Hrdy, 1981). Of course, social pressures on mating
patterns are profound, so it should be no surprise that an individual’s deci-
sions are often severely constrained.
Reciprocity has long been recognized as the engine motivating nonkin re-
lationships, even before Trivers’s (1971) seminal paper, but its special signif-
icance to psychology results from two major discoveries. The first is that kin
selection now explains much that was previously attributed to group selection
(Hamilton, 1964; Williams, 1966). Much altruistic behavior benefits genes
identical to those of the altruist that are in another (related) individual. With
this perspective, the special relationships between blood relatives are ex-
pected. Although opportunities for conflict remain, much self-sacrificing be-
havior is expected as a result of kin selection.
The second discovery is that tit-for-tat is a robust strategy for maximizing
the payoff in reciprocity interactions (Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod and Hamilton,
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dation of human social life, there is always the risk that the other will not
reciprocate. If the maximum long-term benefit comes from repeated coopera-
tion, but the maximum short-term benefit comes from defecting, a problem of
strategy arises. When Axelrod invited scientists to submit programs for how
to deal with this dilemma, the winner was “tit-for-tat,” that is, cooperate on
the first move of the game, and for every subsequent move, do what the other
person did last time. The strategy takes advantage of cooperation when that is
possible but avoids exploitation.
Cosmides and Tooby  (1989) have provided data supporting the existence
of specific mental algorithms to detect cheaters, a finding that could have im-
portance for states of paranoia. Others have argued that sociopathy is a spe-
cialized evolved strategy for taking advantage of human dependence on reci-
procity exchange (Harpending and  Sobus,  1987;  Mealey,  1995).
If the social emotions-friendship, anger, suspicion, anxiety, and  guilt-
are viewed as adaptations designed to deal with different outcomes in a reci-
procity exchange, then this begins to explain some of the complexity and ran-
domness of the expression these emotions (Frank,  1988;  Nesse, 1990) and their
variable development and association with various kinds of psychopathology.
In particular, specialized emotions of friendship and affection may arise from
trustworthy exchanges. When you think that the other may defect, suspicion
is aroused, while if the defection actually takes place, anger signals that the
defection is unacceptable and must be remedied if the relationship is to con-
tinue. Conversely, when we are tempted to defect, anxiety often inhibits our
actions after a defection, most of us feel guilty, which induces states of self-
punishment that are hard to understand from other perspectives but that make
sense as a way to reestablish a reciprocity relationship after a defection (table
14.2).
This chapter has so far addressed various aspects of human behavior that
are often thought to be abnormal but in fact can be recognized either as de-
fenses or as behavior patterns that tend to increase reproductive success. What
kinds of research projects will be needed to advance work in this area? It is
essential to keep separate several questions about such defenses.
First, there is the question of the function of the basic capacity for a defense,
such as anxiety or mood. Recast, this question asks why individuals with this
capacity have a selective advantage over those who do not. To address the
question, one uses the same approaches used by physiologists in ascertaining
Table 14.2 The social emotions and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Other cooperates Other defects
Self cooperates
Self defects
Friendship, trust
Before: Anxiety
After: Guilt
Before:  Suspicion
After:  Anger
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the functions of an organ: take it out, block its effects, or look at what happens
to people who have innately high or low levels. Such studies face special
difficulties. People who report few experiences of the negative emotion may
lack the capacity, but they also may simply be living fortunate lives. Then,
also, there is the expectation that natural selection will set the regulation of
inexpensive defenses to a hair-trigger (the “smoke detector principle”), so that
many expressions of the defense will be unnecessary. We don’t even have solid
documentation of the value of fever in many everyday infections, so it may be
some time before we have evidence for the value of low mood.
Second is the question of how a defense is regulated. This involves multiple
levels, from the psychological to brain chemicals. Interestingly, it appears that
we know more about the brain mechanisms than we do about the psycholog-
ical mechanisms that regulate mood. The range of factors that can explain
within-individual variation is daunting: diet, exercise, sunlight, changes in
social status, sexual experiences, martial changes, family conflicts, work
stress, social support, community structure changes, substance use and abuse,
health, sleep patterns, cognitive patterns, media exposure, trauma, opportu-
nity, and myriad other factors. Studies of the same individuals with frequent
sampling over days and months may begin to give answers to these questions.
Third is the question of why people differ in their tendencies to certain
emotions like low mood and anxiety. Unpacked, this question includes many
facets, such as baseline levels of mood and anxiety, overall emotionality, re-
sponsiveness to positive events, responsiveness to negative events, duration
of responses, cognitive patterns that mediate responses, and responsiveness
to social cues. There is now strong evidence that genetic factors have strong
effects on baseline mood levels and tendencies to mood disorders, but we do
not yet know whether these effects are direct or mediated by genetic effects
on cognition or stress responses.
Fourth, there are questions about differences in these reactions between
groups. Rates of major depression vary lo-fold between different countries
(Weissman et al.,  1996). Although this variation may be explained by the above
factors, it may also require systematic assessment of cultural and family struc-
tures to see how they interact with the regulation mechanisms.
The research agenda to study emotions and other defenses is crowded. Even
as it is just getting started, an evolutionary approach helps to clarify the ques-
tions and suggest possible answers.
Novelty
Arms Races
In general medicine, evolutionary arms races are most clearly manifest in path-
ogen-host competitions. We are still susceptible to infection after all these
eons of exposure because pathogens evolve much faster than we do and so can
outflank nearly any defense our body evolves (Ewald,  1993). Some psychiatric
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illnesses may turn out to result from infection with agents that have evolved
to evade our defenses. In particular, some cases of schizophrenia may result
from  in utero exposure to viruses (Kendell and Kemp, 1989). Also, there are
some recent data suggesting that some cases of obsessive-compulsive disorder
may arise after streptococcal-infection-precipitated autoimmune damage to
the basal ganglia, including the caudate nucleus which is strongly implicated
in the pathophysiology of obsessive-compulsive disorder (Allen et al., 1995)
These findings are by no means conclusive, but would tie together many con-
fusing aspects of obsessive-compulsive disorder and would help to explain
the pattern of onset, the association with Sydenham’s chorea, the pattern of
blood antibodies observed in patients and controls, and the genetic predis-
position to obsessive-compulsive disorder.
Another kind of arms race has already been alluded to, that between mem-
bers of the same species. A number of authors have emphasized the possibility
that intense human-human competition has shaped the rapid increase in hu-
man brain size and intelligence and cognitive complexity (Alexander, 1979;
Dawkins, 1976; Humphrey, 1976). The results of such a competition could
also explain, as some of the previous authors of works on evolution and psy-
chodynamics have shown, some of the inordinate complexity of human psy-
chology. If our empathy is a tool to help us manipulate others and avoid being
manipulated, then layer on layer of complexity may have been laid down by
the process of natural selection (Krebs and Dawkins,  1984).
Novel Aspects of the Physical and Social Environment
A large proportion of disease now results from novel aspects of our physical
environment. For instance, atherosclerosis, the complications of which will
prove fatal for more than a third of us, is due mainly to our evolved preference
for fats and the current ready availability of kinds of fats that were less com-
mon in the ancestral environment (Eaton et al.,  1988).  Substance abuse, auto
accidents, many infections, cancer, Alzheimer’s disease, and other diseases of
old age are also experienced almost exclusively in the modern environment.
It is enough to make one long for life in the Stone Age. Until, that is, one thinks
for a moment about the even greater burden posed by other diseases in the
Paleolithic. The same goes for psychiatric disorders. While it is undoubtedly
true that some proportion of current mental disorders arise because of our
modern environment (Glantz and Pearce, 1989), it is by no means correct that
this implies we would be mentally better off in an earlier environment. It is
possible that mood and anxiety disorders are less frequent in more traditional
cultures, but we do not yet know.
Substance abuse is the most significant mental disorder that is a product of
our novel environment. While people in all cultures and times have used
drugs, ready availability of a steady supply of potent agents, in conjunction
with novel means of administration such as hypodermic needles and crack
pipes, has made substance abuse an international plague. An evolutionary
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are designed to repeat behaviors that stimulate reinforcing mechanisms in the
brain. When these mechanisms are stimulated directly by drugs instead of by
natural experiences, drug-seeking behavior can take over the organism’s be-
havioral control mechanisms (Nesse and Berridge, 1998; Pomerleau, 1997).
Although it is not surprising that people vary in their genetic susceptibility to
addiction, it is also not surprising that untoward circumstances also make
certain people especially vulnerable. The genes that predispose to substance
abuse are sometimes called defects, but given that they probably imposed no
harm in the Paleolithic, it would be much more appropriate to call them
“quirks.”
Obesity and eating disorders also arise from our novel environment. In the
Paleolithic, high-calorie foods were apparently rarely available without sub-
stantial effort, or else natural selection would have shaped more powerful
mechanisms to restrict food intake. Given the selective power of famine, it is
also unsurprising that many people have a tendency to add more pounds than
are necessary or desirable in a modern environment. Severe eating disorders
seem to be peculiarly modern phenomena, arising mainly in the past few score
years in technological societies (Kurth et al., 1995). Some combination of mod-
ern media, food availability, and cultural factors causes many young people
to diet, which then leads to behavior appropriate to starvation, namely, seek-
ing out and devouring any available high-calorie food. This loss of control
causes increased fear of obesity and emotional upheaval that initiates a vicious
cycle of attempts at self-control by dieting, binge eating, followed by guilt and
helplessness, more dieting and more binge eating. A small proportion of peo-
ple who begin this cycle are able to more and more strictly control their intake
to the point it is manifest as anorexia nervosa. The absence of menstrual per-
iods associated with anorexia may well be adaptive in a natural environment,
where it would be wasteful to become pregnant when food supplies are in-
adequate (Condit, 1990; Surbey, 1987; Voland and Voland, 1989).
Some aspects of modern life are so ubiquitous that we rarely notice how
unusual they are. For instance, spending time is classrooms learning to read
is completely novel. It is hard to see what dyslexia and attention deficit dis-
order would have been like in the Paleolithic. For another example, the simple
invention of electric lights seems to have changed people’s sleep patterns pro-
foundly. When people enter a sleep lab with lighting that matches that of the
sun, they typically make up a cumulative sleep deficit of 15 hours before set-
tling in to a pattern of sleeping approximately nine hours per night with
nightly periods of restful wakefulness.
Even conflicts between the sexes may be viewed as a product of novel en-
vironments. When it was not possible for one person to amass significant re-
sources, no one man could control more than a few women. When agriculture
became organized, however, men promptly used surpluses to control other
men to control large number of women in harems (Betzig, 1986). Smuts (1995)
has looked at patterns of social organization and suggested that the relative
absence of female-female bonds in some cultures makes women far more vul-
nerable to male aggression.364 EVOLUTIONARY MEDICINE
One of the more worrisome recent epidemiologic findings suggests that an
extraordinary epidemic of depression may be upon us. In nine separate  epi-
demiological studies, the rates of depression in young people are far higher
than those over a lifetime for older people in the same country (Cross-National
Collaborative Group,  1992).  Although these studies deserve criticism on meth-
odological grounds, it also seems plausible that changing social patterns and
technological changes may indeed be changing rates of depression. If so, we
have an even more urgent need to understand the functions and regulation of
normal mood.
Genes
In psychiatry, as in the rest of medicine, genes that predispose to common
disorders may often also offer benefits that account for their continued fre-
quency, or they may cause disease only in interaction with aspects of the
modern environment. Early hopes that we would be able to identify one or
two specific genes to account for schizophrenia or manic depressive illness
have foundered, but even if multigenic effects are responsible, an evolutionary
explanation for their prevalence can be helpful.
For instance, schizophrenia appears to be quite constant at a prevalence of
about  1%  in diverse human groups. In less modern societies, the course of the
disease may be somewhat more benign, but the prevalence is nonetheless sim-
ilar (Gottesman and Shields,  1982).  Given evidence for strong genetic factors
that predispose to schizophrenia, one must ask why these genes have persisted
given the reproductive disadvantage they cause (Slater et al., 1971).  Many
authors have suggested possible pleiotropic benefits to the genes that cause
schizophrenia. Early, probably erroneous, observations that people with schiz-
ophrenia could withstand cold and disease better than other patients were
once thought to account for the finding (Jarvik and Chadwick,  1972).  More
recently, a variety of proposals for alternative explanations have been put
forth, ranging from ability to discern the unseemly motives of others (Allen
and  Sarich,  1988),  to sexual selection (Crow,  1993),  and circadian regulation
(Feierman,  1994).  While one of these ideas could eventually prove correct, it
seems equally plausible that the relationship is far less direct, such as the
possibility that people with a certain antigenic makeup are protected against
certain infections but they are vulnerable to autoimmune or other factors that
interfere with brain development.
Depression and anxiety are not defects like schizophrenia, but defenses
whose regulation has gone awry. Thus, the genetic trade-offs that cause dif-
ferences in susceptibility to mood and anxiety disorders are directly related
to the higher level trade-off of the regulation of the normal emotion. One can-
not help but wonder why there is such between-individual variability in reg-
ulation of these emotions. The answer may be that different response patterns
are optimally adaptive in different environments. This would be a special case
of the proposal that differences in personality are adaptations for different
social niches (Buss,  1991;   Tooby  and Cosmides,  1990a)WHAT DARWINIAN MEDICINE OFFERS PSYCHIATRY 365
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Alzheimer’s disease may be an example of a manifestation of a pleiotropic
gene with benefits early in life and a cost later in life (Albin, 1994). The jus-
tification for this speculation is the extraordinary frequency of Alzheimer’s
disease, affecting more than half of the people over the age of 90. So far, how-
ever, no one has identified benefits earlier in life for people who carry the
tendencies to Alzheimer’s disease, although factors associated with apolipo-
protein variants could provide an explanation.
Trait Trade-offs
Every trait in the body is a trade-off between multiple benefits and costs. Heav-
ier bones would break less easily, but they would be more expensive to create
and maintain. Lower blood pressure or blood glucose would cause less damage
to tissues, but only at the cost of decreased ability to respond to situations that
require sudden exertion.
Such trade-offs probably account for many aspects of psychiatric illness.
As noted above, too little anxiety may be even worse than too much. On the
level of life strategy, there are disadvantages to investing too little effort in
parenting, and disadvantages to investing too little in mating. The patterns of
modern life are quite peculiar along these lines because the environment does
not require us to each allocate effort proportionately among the tasks of
growth, development, protection, mating, and parenting. Instead, an individ-
ual can devote essentially all his or her resources to one area, neglecting all
the rest. Furthermore, thanks to caffeine, electric lights, and grocery stores, an
individual can, for instance, spend nearly all of his or her waking life simply
reading and writing, a thoroughly abnormal pattern of activity that necessitates
neglect of other tasks. Studies that relate overall patterns of allocation of life
effort to patterns of symptoms have yet to be done.
Historical Constraints
The body offers many illustrations of natural selection’s inability to start fresh
and create a sensible design instead the jury-rigged bodies we have. Our eyes
are inside out, causing blind spots. Our respiratory passages intersect within
the esophagus and food can thus choke us. The awkward design of the spine
causes most of us pain at one time or another. There are undoubtedly similar
examples in our mental mechanisms, but because the connection between the
structure and the function is so much more difficult to ascertain and because
of the difficulties of carrying out comparative or historical studies, this is a
nebulous area. Our patterns of reasoning may, however, provide an important
example. We all routinely make substantial errors in logic that reveal under-
lying biases and rules of thumb (Nisbett and Ross,  1980;  Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1974) Rules of thumb substitute for logic perhaps because the first cog-
nitive mechanisms were based on these crude rules, and there has never been
a selective force that could supplant them or make the leap to primary  de-366 EVOLUTIONARY MEDICINE
pendence on Bayesian thinking. The mystery is that we have a capacity for
logical thought at all. It seems quite possible that this is either an epiphenom-
enon  or a product of sexual selection (Miller, in press). Our emotional reac-
tions may likewise reflect the continuity with our predecessors. Studies of
primate cognition may eventually intersect with the studies of human cogni-
tive and social psychology to give us more knowledge about these possibilities.
Conclusions
Given that there is not yet an evolutionary psychology that can provide psy-
chiatry with knowledge comparable to what physiology provides for the rest
of medicine, can an evolutionary approach still be useful to psychiatry? As
documented in the preceding pages, the answer is yes. The danger now is in
taking this preliminary knowledge too far. Several caveats may help. First of
all, I would argue that Darwinian psychiatry is not, and should not be, a field
of medical practice, but only a basic science that offers us insight and good
questions to ask. A Darwinian approach to human nature and human psycho-
pathology is essential to our understanding, but it gives no direct treatment
recommendations whatsoever. As is the case with the rest of medicine, clinical
recommendations must come from clinical studies. In the area of psychiatry,
one must also reinforce the warning that behavior and ethical precepts cannot
be derived from biological knowledge. For instance, just because males have
more of a tendency than females to abandon their families tells us nothing
whatsoever about the moral significance of such acts. Such warnings about
the naturalistic fallacy are common in the literature on evolution and psy-
chology, but this is for the good reason that many people, despite warnings,
readily draw norms from facts. Furthermore, our understandings of the origins
and functional significance of aspects of culture, and the biological underpin-
nings that make it possible for individuals to absorb culture, remind us that
our understanding is rudimentary and is not to be trusted as a guide for action.
With these caveats in mind, however, an evolutionary view already offers
an extraordinarily useful guide for understanding our patients. Even our crude
state of knowledge takes us a giant leap from the idiosyncratic theories without
biological foundation that have characterized much of the history of psychol-
ogy. Furthermore, the age-old problem of “normality” makes much more sense
in an evolutionary perspective. From a perspective of reproductive success,
many emotions, cognitions, and behaviors patterns that have been thought of
as pathological can be recognized as adaptive, even if often distressing or so-
cially prohibited. And for some of these, like anxiety, it is clinically useful to
explain their functions to patients. When people who experience panic attacks
learn that their symptoms are the normal fight-flight response that is going off
at the wrong time, this often helps them give up their fears that the symptoms
are caused by heart or brain disease.
These principles are likely to have early application as a foundation for a
revised perspective on psychiatric diagnosis. The successive Diagnostic andWHAT DARWINIAN MEDICINE OFFERS PSYCHIATRY 367
Statistical manuals  published by the American Psychiatric Association have
been essential in allowing researchers to study comparable groups, but they
have also been widely criticized because they lack a foundation in theory and
they encourage simplistic thinking of psychiatric syndromes as discrete dis-
eases (Kendell, 1984). An evolutionary view, by contrast, requires us to use
what we know about the emotions and their regulation and thus to distinguish
several categories of mental disorders. First, there are conditions that are pain-
ful and perhaps undesirable, but normal and evolutionarily useful, like much
jealousy, anxiety and sadness. Second, there are conditions that arise from an
initially normal brain that has been exposed to learning or trauma that leads
to emotional pathology or maladaptive behavior. Third, there are conditions,
like most depression and panic disorder, that arise from dysregulation caused
by genetic vulnerability interacting with environmental factors. Fourth, there
are conditions that arise from primary abnormalities of brain tissue, like
obsessive-compulsive disorder, schizophrenia, and Alzheimer’s disease. In
contrast to current diagnostic systems that encourage separation of a patient’s
difficulties into many “co-morbid” conditions, an evolutionary approach fos-
ters exploration of all the factors that interact to account for a person’s emo-
tional and behavioral difficulties.
Finally, the greatest current value of a Darwinian perspective on psychiatry
is its heuristic utility. Without an evolutionary perspective, Daly and Wilson
never would have asked about the frequency of child abuse in families with a
step-parent present. Without an evolutionary perspective, it is far harder to
even imagine the possible benefits of anxiety, sadness, and grief. Without an
evolutionary perspective, it is hard to ask the right questions about the func-
tional significance of various aspects of human nature, adaptive and maladap-
tive.
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